

Summary Breakdown on 72 Detainee Cases in Iraq

**For the Period
May 31, 2003 to December 20, 2003**

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Introduction

Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) is an independent, faith-based, violence-reduction project, sponsored and supported by thousands of Christian churches across North America, especially by Mennonite, Brethren and Quaker denominations. CPT has placed violence-reduction teams and/or delegations in the following locations since its genesis in 1988: Hebron, Palestine; Chiapas, Mexico; Barrancabermeja, Colombia; New Brunswick and Ontario, Canada; South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, D.C. and New York, USA; Vieques, Puerto Rico; Bosnia; Haiti; Afghanistan; and Iraq. CPT's violence-reduction work around the world is based on members' Christian faith, inspired by Jesus of Nazareth's example, as well as by other leaders, such as Gandhi, Badsha Khan, Martin Luther King, Jr. and peacemakers from other religions and traditions.

CPT has maintained a peaceful presence in Iraq since October 2002. The team's activities during this period have included campaigning to prevent the invasion of the Coalition, seeking to protect vital civil infrastructure facilities during the war in March and April, observing and documenting the Coalition's activities and consequential damages during the war and the following occupation, supporting non-violent efforts of local Iraqis for justice and peace, seeking to open lines of communication between Iraqi human rights workers and Coalition representatives, seeking to develop better relationships between religious groups in Iraq, advocating for just and humane treatment of persons the Coalition Forces have captured and detained and their families, and campaigning for changes in or development of Coalition policies which threaten the safety of Coalition soldiers, contracted workers and common Iraqis.

The following statistical report is a preliminary summary of information relating to Iraqis who have been captured and detained by Coalition Forces compiled by Christian Peacemaker Teams in Iraq. All of the information comes from reports and testimonies from detainees themselves, friends and family of detainees, and information obtained from Coalition Forces representatives and/or contracted workers for the Coalition, as recorded by CPT workers between May 31 and December 20, 2003.

In general, the statistics speak for themselves. However, the reader may benefit from an explanation of the context from which this information comes, CPT's method of gathering information and following up on cases, and trends from these cases that CPT Iraq finds most significant.

During the major military operations in Iraq (March 15 to May 1, 2003), the Coalition Forces captured thousands of Iraqis. Some of them were members of opposition forces and duly classified as prisoners of war. Some of them were common citizens who happened to be in the way of Coalition Forces and were captured as civilian interns. Others of them were charged with involvement with opposition forces, resistance groups, foreign terrorist groups, or the former regime and were captured as security detainees. In order to accommodate these captives, the Coalition Forces created a number of makeshift detention camps, some of which were adapted from existing facilities, but many of which were not. Many, if not most, prisoners of war and civilian interns captured during major military operations have since been released. However, as the sole governing body in Iraq after Saddam Hussein's regime fell on April 9, 2003, the Coalition acquired responsibility for all criminals at all levels in the penal system in the country.

Since that time, Coalition Forces have employed thousands of Iraqi policemen and dozens of Iraqi judges to manage the bulk of Iraqi criminal cases. Yet to date, Coalition Forces continue to

capture and indefinitely detain persons whom they accuse of crimes against the Coalition and classify as security detainees. Details on these persons—their total number, their whereabouts, their legal processes, etc.—remain undisclosed by the Coalition.

Christian Peacemaker Teams first became involved with issues related to detainees during May of 2003 after a few Iraqis came to team members asking for help finding information about their detained relatives. Even with their initiative, persistence and language abilities, CPT members found it very difficult to obtain any accurate information about detainees in Iraq. However, after pressing some military officers at the Coalition's Iraqi Assistance Center in Baghdad, CPT members were able to obtain information on the whereabouts of a few detainees. The families of these detainees were very relieved to find out their relatives were alive and relatively safe. Some of these family members were then able to visit their relatives in the Coalition detention camps.

During the process of trying to find information on these first few detainees, CPT members found that there were hundreds of frantic family members of detainees trying everything they could think of to get information about their relatives: they crowded around crying for attention and help from Coalition soldiers at the gates (with the concrete barriers, concertina wire, tanks, machine guns and all) of Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC), the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the detention camps. They also went to representatives in the Iraqi Assistance Center (IAC)—which has several armed checkpoints, limiting accessibility for Iraqis greatly—the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and local human rights groups pleading for assistance. CPT quickly realized the gravity of the problem of lack of communication about detainees, as many of the family members were furious or devastated when they failed to find any information, calling down curses on the Coalition and equating it with Saddam's regime.

Thus, in the early part of the summer in 2003, CPT members, who were at the time lacking a clear focus for their violence-reduction work in Iraq, decided to devote large amounts of their efforts to assisting families of detainees and investigating the Coalition's process for capturing, detaining and processing persons accused of crimes against the Coalition. By the middle of September, CPT had taken on dozens of cases and was devoting the majority of its resources to issues relating to detainees.

CPT acquires detainee cases through a number of means, including from friends of the team, walk-ins, contacts through local human rights groups, and contacts through local mosques. The general process by which CPT attempts to help relatives of detainees is as follows. First, take testimonies from family members or other reputable contacts—such as lawyers at human rights groups or sheikhs at local mosques—of detainees about the detainees' backgrounds, circumstances of the detainees' capture, and, if applicable and possible, document the evidence of the detainees' capture (e.g. photograph the bullet holes in the windows of the detainees' houses from the raid in which they were captured).

Second, go with relatives or other contacts of detainees to places where Coalition spokespersons have said Iraqis can get information—namely, Iraqi police stations, CMOCs (which are now called General Information Centers (GIC) and are mostly operated by Iraqis) and the IAC—and press to get as much information as possible.

Often, the process halts at the second step because persons at the stated information centers

either have no information to give or are unwilling to disclose the information they have. If, however, CPT members and/or the persons they are accompanying are able to find information, the decision is then left up to the relatives of the detainees as to what, if anything, they would like to do next.

Most relatives of detainees, upon learning where the detainees were being held, want to try to visit the detainees. This, then, is the third step. In a few instances, CPT members accompanied relatives of detainees to the detention camp at Baghdad International Airport, and they were completely refused entry for any reason every time. In a few separate instances, CPT members accompanied relatives of detainees to the detention camp (Bucca) in Um Qasr, where they experienced success in getting visitation appointments. After CPT's initial success in Um Qasr, many relatives of detainees felt empowered to travel there and schedule appointments for themselves.

Most of them were also successful at camp Bucca—where, according to CPT members' experience and testimonies of families and detainees, the US Major in charge of visitations went out of her way to help Iraqis as much as she could—until the Coalition transferred most of Bucca's detainees to Abu Ghraib prison just west of Baghdad. Everyone, including CPT members, has great difficulty getting visitations at Abu Ghraib. To date, CPT has only failed in every attempt to assist any relative to get a visit with his or her detainee at Abu Ghraib.

As with the third step, the fourth step depends on the wishes of the relatives of the detainees, as well as the wishes of the detainees themselves. In many of the cases CPT has acquired, relatives and/or contacts of the detainees insist that the detainees are being held unjustly and request CPT's help in pursuing justice. In such cases, CPT members investigate further about the background and character of the detainee and his relatives from local contacts. Additionally, CPT members investigate further the circumstance of the detainees' capture. CPT members can never be sure about the guilt or innocence of detainees, but in cases in which it seems clear that the detainees are not guilty of the crimes they were accused of committing at the time of capture, and in which family members rely on their detained relatives for support, CPT members make a special push for the Coalition to release such detainees. In any case—whether the detainee seems innocent or not—CPT members press Coalition members for a speedy, fair, and transparent process for handling detainees.

Methods for pressuring the Coalition to release such detainees include meeting with the highest ranking officers they can at a number of locations, reporting to them the story according to CPT members' investigation, perhaps submitting written statements from relatives of detainees, and appealing for the immediate release of the detainees. The highest-ranking officers with whom CPT members have met are colonels, but appeals are usually only heard by captains and majors. In some cases, Coalition representatives simply say they cannot do anything to help. In other cases, Coalitions representatives express concern about the case and agree to pass messages along to their superiors. In a few cases, Coalition representatives agree to make a special recommendation for the release of certain detainees. In all cases, however, Coalition representatives with whom CPT members meet say they have not the authority to release any detainees and that regardless of the circumstances, the processes will be slow.

To date, a handful of detainees for whom CPT members made a special push have indeed been released. Naturally, these detainees and their families are very grateful for CPT members'

assistance. Unfortunately, however, CPT members have yet no way of confirming whether their efforts affected the detainees' processing. Besides those mentioned above, a number of other detainees whose cases CPT members have been following were released. Step five is to interview the released detainee about his experiences, if he is willing. In the last three months, CPT members have taken testimonies from several released detainees, and their accounts are reflected in the statistical report below.

The sixth and final step is to publish testimonies from detainees or their relatives and reports about specific instances of injustice (which causes exasperation, which is the foundation for violent resistance against the Coalition) as well as summary reports, such as this. The goal in publishing these documents is to raise awareness about the situation with regard to detainees among the public in North America, so as to pressure Coalition policy-makers to improve the problem, for their own safety as well as for the safety of Iraqis. Publishing testimonies and reports may occur at any point along the process, depending on the circumstances of the cases.

The following statistical summary reflects 72 of the cases for which CPT members have invested the most resources. There are hundreds more cases like these, and CPT members have to turn people away every day because they are working at capacity already. The amount of involvement with the cases reflected in this report varies significantly. The minimum level of investigation required for a case to be reflected in this report is to follow through on steps one and two from above. In some cases, however, CPT members have gone beyond all of the normal steps, such that members have themselves tried to get information about specific detainees scores of times, visited detainees while in detention, and made friends with relatives of detainees and/or former detainees themselves.

Regardless of the level of involvement, the compiler has attempted to err on the conservative side to be sure that this report is not slanderous. Only information CPT members have confirmed from reputable sources is reported with certainty. CPT members are aware that intense emotions affect persons' memories, but they are not able or qualified to psychoanalyze or polygraph test persons. Thus, reported incidences of damage, injury, property confiscation, or abuse are listed as "reported instances," rather than as "known instances." With regard to tabulation, the compiler has attempted to remain especially conservative. Thus, for example, if a released detainee reported in his testimony that he was "beaten many times by the guards at the Airport," the compiler tabulated only two reported instances of the minimum form of abuse, hitting with hands. If, however, the released detainee was specific and detailed about his abuse—including the exact type of abuse, the place and approximate time, and the number of instances—the compiler tabulated as many reported instances of abuse as the released detainee reported. The same method applies to all of the categories in the report. For further clarification, the reader may find it helpful to refer to the selected glossary of terms following the statistical summary.

During their six months of involvement with detainee issues, CPT members have encountered a number of problematic trends and patterns on many levels in the way that the Coalition manages detainees. Of all these trends and patterns, the following are those that CPT members find most troubling, according to their own estimation and according to their gauge of popular sentiment in Iraq.

Since the end of major military operations, Coalition Forces (CF) have been on the hunt for suspected insurgents, Baathists and terrorists in an attempt to cleanly sweep Iraq of all violent

resistors. CF frequently raid citizens' homes in the middle of the night in locations where their intelligence indicates such persons are staying. Many Iraqis complain that the CF act on false information by persons with malicious intent. Many Iraqis also complain that CF mistakenly raid houses sometimes, and capture the men inside even after they learn the house they raided was not the one they intended to raid. While military intelligence files are classified, several Coalition representatives have admitted to CPT members that sometimes the intelligence which leads to a house raid comes from Iraqis who seek to settle a vendetta with other Iraqis by giving false information, and that sometimes CF squads make mistakes and raid houses and/or capture persons they did not intend to raid or capture. The representatives have acknowledged these phenomena as significant problems, but they have expressed no intent to try to change them.

When CF raid a house, they behave as if the persons inside certainly have very dangerous weapons, which they are most likely planning to use against CF. In other words, CF storm houses in the middle of the night where families with small children live in the same manner that they storm military facilities. They often break through the front gate with armored vehicles or explosives and break through the doors and/or windows of the house with their weapons aimed at anything that moves.

Sometimes they come in shooting. In nearly all of the cases in which detainees and/or families of detainees report CF raided their houses, the families and/or detainees report that they first assumed that the raiding soldiers were looters coming to rob them and they prepared themselves to defend their family and property.

Overall, the situations are intensely frightening and confusing for all parties, which greatly increases the probability of error. Whether by error or by intent, CPT reports show a trend of CF damaging much property and frequently injuring captured persons and/or their family members during house raids.

Furthermore, CPT reports show trends of CF confiscating perfectly legal property (such as money and jewelry) from the house without giving receipts and capturing persons in the house without stating the reason for their arrest. These two issues, aside from being unjust, have, in the experience of CPT members, proved to be major points of contention among Iraqis. Whether they themselves have fallen victim to these trends or not, most Iraqis are aware of these problems and they are angry at the Coalition as a result. In summary, CPT members strongly believe that CF create more resistance fighters every time they raid a house, even if the persons inside the house are guilty of crimes against the Coalition.

As was explained above, CF have captured many persons in Iraq for many reasons and had to create makeshift facilities to hold all of them. The testimonies of the released detainees CPT has interviewed indicate that the Coalition's detention is far below satisfactory. All of CPT's interviewees reported having to stay in crowded tents, usually sleeping on the desert floor with improper bedding, and being mixed in with convicted criminals. There is also an apparent trend of conditions as well as treatment being the poorest at the first one or two holding facilities.

Released detainees report a lack of food and/or very poor quality food, lack of water and/or very poor quality water (from chemicals), and overcrowded quarters in these locations especially. In addition, of those released detainees who reported abuse while in detention, most reported that the abuse they experienced occurred at either a local military base where they were first taken or

at the Airport (a.k.a. Camp Victory).

Another trend in the Coalition's detention system is that detainees are often transferred to a facility that is a long distance from their home. This adds to confusion and makes it impossible for many relatives of detainees who would otherwise be able to visit to do so because they lack the necessary funds to make a long journey. In fact, the experience of CPT members shows that camp Bucca in Um Qasr (once a primary holding facility for the Coalition) had the best visitation system, but was also the farthest camp from Baghdad in Iraq, not to mention the highest summer temperatures. As with the house raids, word about the poor detention conditions spreads quickly among Iraqis. The common sentiment is that the Coalition treats detainees the same as Saddam's regime treated detainees, if not worse. Some of the problems are exaggerated in rumors, but CPT reports show that detention conditions are deplorable at best. Undoubtedly, these conditions exacerbate growing resentment against the Coalition, which feeds violent resistance movements in Iraq.

While Iraqis inside detention camps suffer from sub-standard conditions, their families and friends suffer on the outside from a general inability to communicate with their detained relatives or even get information about them. To the knowledge of CPT members, no Coalition representative has ever by his/her own initiative given information about a detainee to relatives. In the experience of CPT members, most relatives of detainees spend many hours trying to find out anything they can about their detained relative from anyone they can. If one travels to the gate of a Coalition detention facility on any given day at any given time, one will be sure to find at least a dozen family members of detainees trying desperately to get information about their detained relatives. During the summer of 2003, one could find the same situation at most of the CMOCs around Baghdad. Frequently, the only way families learn anything about their detained relative is from released detainees who were sent by other detainees to tell their families where and how they are.

Only after much persistence have CPT members been able to acquire any information about detainees. During late summer 2003, CPT members tried everything they could think of to get information: they went to the Iraqi Assistance Center, the nearest CMOCs and Iraqi police stations to the place of capture, the biggest CMOCs, the ICRC, area morgues, the prison camps they knew of, the CPA headquarters, and local human rights groups. They also telephoned and emailed several military officers.

Coalition representatives at each Coalition center frequently told CPT members that they had no information and no access to information about detainees, and that CPT members should talk to someone at one of the other centers for such information.

After humoring such requests a few times and running around the same circles, CPT members decided to focus on one location and keep pressing for information there. They were able to achieve some success at the IAC_which was becoming less and less accessible to Iraqis because of bolstered security measures_and the CPA headquarters in Baghdad. Ultimately, contacts within the IAC proved most helpful. Whatever information CPT members learned, they passed on to families directly or via contacts.

The vast majority of Iraqis with whom CPT members have had contact find the Coalition's system of communicating information about detainees (rather, the lack thereof) to be intolerable.

They feel betrayed by the Coalition leaders, who promised an end to totalitarianism and a new future of freedom, democracy and justice, yet who, according to these Iraqis' perception, seem to act just as secretly, dishonestly and unsympathetically as Saddam. Moreover, they feel the Coalition has insulted their dignity by forcing them to do such things as crowd in earthen lots under the hot sun for hours just to get a contracted translator to check for their detained relatives' prison numbers so they can get visits. Since the occupation began, these circumstances have barely improved. Many Iraqis have already lost their patients, and many others are losing patience quickly. Resentment and aggression against the Coalition replace the lost patience, and violent resistance movements gain credibility among the public.

CPT members have voiced their concerns about these trends to a few commissioned officers_some who rank as high as colonel. A couple of these officers have listened to these concerns and agreed that the safety of every Coalition soldier is wrapped up in how Iraqis perceive the behavior of Coalition representatives. However, the problems these trends indicate largely stem from decisions made by policy-makers rather than field officers and soldiers. Thus, CPT members have created this report not only as reference for persons who are curious about CPT's work in Iraq, but also as a resource for persons who want to impress upon Coalition policy-makers to make better decisions, which will lead to more safety for Iraqis as well as Coalition soldiers.

Statistical Summary

Total number of cases of persons detained by Coalition Forces (CF): 72

I. Demographic Information

A. Gender

i. 71 men

ii. 1 woman

B. Age

- i. Range: 16 to 74 years
- ii. Average age: 32 years
- iii. Number of minors: 1 (16 years)

C. Nationality

- i. Number of Iraqi nationals: 65
 - a. Home locations:
 - 1. Baghdad: 54
 - al-Aadhumiya: 27
 - al-Jehad: 3
 - al-Qadasiya: 3
 - al-Ghazaliya: 2
 - al-Saab: 1
 - al-Ameriya: 2
 - al-Saidai: 1
 - al-Majhtel: 1
 - al-Nasir: 1
 - al-Monsour: 1
 - al-Salhiya: 1
 - al-Dora: 1
 - al-Thawra: 1
 - al-Sayediyah: 1
 - al-Hader: 1
 - 2. al-Ramadi: 2
 - 3. Diala: 2
 - 4. Kerbala: 1
 - 5. al-Samwaw: 1
 - 6. Unknown city: 5

- ii. Number of Iranian nationals: 4
- iii. Number of persons whose nationality Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) does not know: 3

II. Capture Information

A. Date of Capture

- i. Cases in which CF reportedly captured the person during major military operations (15 March _ 1 May 03): 6
- ii. Cases in which CF reportedly captured the person after major military operations (2 May 03 _ present): 63
- iii. Cases in which CPT does not know the date of capture: 3

B. Charges against the Captive

- i. Cases in which CPT knows the captive was accused of a civil crime(s): 0
- ii. Cases in which CPT knows the captive was accused of a crime(s) against CF: 27

C. Place of Capture

- i. Cases in which CF reportedly captured the person in his home: 25
- ii. Cases in which CF reportedly captured the person outside his/her home: 23

D. Method of Capture

- i. Cases in which CPT knows CF captured the person during a raid on his home: 25
 - a. Cases in which CF reportedly used a humvee(s) and foot soldiers without gunfire or explosives: 15
 - b. Cases in which CF reportedly used a humvee(s) and foot soldiers with gunfire and/or explosives: 10
 - c. Cases in which CF reportedly used a large armored vehicle(s) without gun/cannon fire: 4
 - d. Cases in which CF reportedly used a large armored vehicle(s) with gun/cannon fire: 0
 - e. Cases in which CF reportedly used a helicopter(s) without gun or rocket fire: 7
 - f. Cases in which CF reportedly used a helicopter(s) with gun and/or rocket fire: 0

- ii. Cases in which CF raided the same house more than once: 2
- iii. Cases in which CF admitted error for the raid at the event of the raid: 4
 - a. Cases in which CF captured the person after an admission of error: 4
- iv. Cases in which persons in the house physically resisted the raiding CF: 1
- v. Cases in which CF damaged property of the captive and/or his family during the house raid: 16
 - a. Cases in which CF damaged property by gunfire: 9
 - b. Cases in which CF damaged property by explosives: 7
 - c. Cases in which CF damaged property by military vehicles: 4
 - d. Cases in which CF damaged property by soldiers, physically: 5
- vi. Cases in which CF injured the captive during the raid: 10
 - a. Reported instances of injury by gunfire: 2
 - b. Reported instances of injury by glass or shrapnel: 0
 - c. Reported instances of injury by physical force: 8
 - 1. Reported instances of injury by hitting with hands: 6
 - 2. Reported instances of injury by hitting with weapons: 3
 - 3. Reported instances of injury by kicking: 3
 - 4. Reported instances of injury by stomping: 3
 - 5. Reported instances of injury by shoving: 1
- vii. Cases in which CF injured the captive's family members during the raid: 6
 - a. Total number of family members of captives injured: 7
 - 1. Reported instances of injury by gunfire: 3
 - 2. Reported instances of injury by glass or shrapnel: 1
 - 3. Reported instances of injury by physical force: 1
 - Reported instances of injury by hitting with hands: 0
 - Reported instances of injury by hitting with weapon: 0
 - Reported instances of injury by kicking: 1
 - Reported instances of injury by stomping: 1

- Reported instances of injury by shoving: 0

b. Number of family members who died as a result of these injuries: 2

E. Property Confiscation

i. Cases in which CF confiscated property of the captive or his/her family: 24

a. Reported instances of CF confiscating firearms: 3

b. Reported instances of CF confiscating money: 6

c. Reported instances of CF confiscating jewelry: 4

d. Reported instances of CF confiscating electronics: 4

e. Reported instances of CF confiscating other property: 4

f. Reported instances of CF giving receipts for confiscated property: 0

g. Cases in which CPT knows CF returned all confiscated property: 0

h. Cases in which CPT knows CF returned partial amounts of confiscated property: 1

III. Detention Information

A. Place of Detention

i. Number of detainees CPT knows have spent time in the following CF facilities:

a. Camp Bucca, Um Qasr: 27

b. Baghdad International Airport: 21

c. Abu Ghraib, Baghdad: 16

d. Nasariya: 5

e. Ibn Sina Hospital, Coalition Headquarters, Baghdad: 2

f. BCF: 1

g. Baquba: 1

h. Tikrit: 1

i. al-Shaab Stadium, Baghdad: 1

B. Current Status of Detainees

i. Cases in which CPT knows CF have released the detainee: 24

a. Range of length of detention: 3 days to 200 days

- b. Average length of detention: 57 days
 - c. Cases in which the detainee was convicted of a crime: 0
- ii. Cases in which CPT's reports show CF are still holding the detainee: 38
 - a. Cases in which CPT knows CF have allowed the detainee legal council: 0
 - b. Cases in which CPT knows CF have reviewed the detainee's case: 0
 - c. Cases in which CPT knows the detainee has had a trial: 0
 - d. Cases in which CPT knows the detainee has been convicted of a crime: 0

C. CF's Treatment of Detainees

- i. Cases in which CF and/or contracted workers reportedly abused the detainee: 10
 - a. Reported instances of hitting with hands: 11
 - b. Reported instances of hitting with other objects: 1
 - c. Reported instances of kicking: 5
 - d. Reported instances of stomping: 2
 - e. Reported instances of aggressive shoving: 6
 - f. Reported instances of other physical abuse: 2
 - g. Reported instances of excessively tight handcuffing: 4
 - h. Reported instances of prolonged handcuffing: 10
 - i. Reported instances of prolonged forced kneeling: 7
 - j. Reported instances of prolonged exposure to sunlight: 4
 - k. Reported instances of prolonged covering of eyes: 3
 - l. Reported instances of prolonged exposure to loud music: 2
 - m. Reported instances of deprivation of food: 3
 - n. Reported instances of deprivation of water: 11
 - o. Reported instances of deprivation of minimal sanitary conditions: 2
 - p. Reported instances of deprivation of urination privileges: 1
 - q. Reported instances of refusal of necessary medical care: 2

- r. Reported instances of electrocution: 1
- s. Reported instances of prying off a toenail: 1
- t. Reported instances of psychological abuse: 3

D. Communication of Information about Detainees

- i Cases in which CF/contracted workers gave information about the detainee to family or friends: 33
 - a. Reported instances of info. given at initiation of CF/contracted workers: 0
 - b. Reported instances of info. given at first request of family/friends: 7
 - c. Reported instances of info. given only after family, friends and/or CPT persisted: 32
 - d. Reported instances of info. given only after family members paid a bribe to CF/contracted workers: 2
 - e. Reported instances in which info. given turned out to be false: 8
- ii. Reported instances of family or friends attempting to get info. from CF or contracted workers and failing: 100
- iii. Cases in which the ICRC gave info. about detainees to family or friends: 2
 - a. Reported instances of info. given at the initiation of the ICRC: 0
 - b. Reported instances of info. given at the request of family/friends: 2
- iv. Reported instances of family or friends attempting to get info. from the ICRC and failing: 11
- v. Cases in which the Iraqi Police (IP) gave info. about detainees to family or friends: 4
 - a. Reported instances of info. given at the initiation of the IP: 1
 - b. Reported instances of info. given at the request of family/friends: 3
- vi. Reported instances of family or friends attempting to get info. from the IP and failing: 3

E. Visitations

- i. Cases in which family tried to schedule a visit(s) with detainees: 29
 - a. Cases in which family members were able to visit detainees: 11
 - b. Reported instances of failed attempts to schedule visits: 10

Selected Glossary of Terms

Hitting with hands: Intentionally striking part of a person's body with one's hand in either a lateral or a vertical motion (e.g. boxing a person in the nose, chopping a person on the neck, etc.).

Hitting with other objects: Intentionally striking part of a person's body with a solid object manipulated by one's hands in either a lateral or a vertical motion (e.g. striking a person in the mouth with the butt of an M-16 rifle, striking a person on the shoulder with a club, etc.).

Kicking: Intentionally striking part of a person's body with one's foot in a lateral motion (e.g. striking a person in the ribs with one's foot while the person is lying on the ground, etc.).

Stomping: Intentionally striking or pressing heavily in part of a person's body with one's foot in a vertical motion (e.g. striking a person on the back with the sole of one's foot while the person is lying face-down on the ground, pressing heavily with one's foot on the back of a person's head while the person is lying face-down on the ground, etc.).

Aggressive shoving: Intentionally thrusting a person with one's hands, arms, foot, leg, and/or

body such that the person falls violently to the ground, against the wall, or against another solid object (e.g. thrusting a person with one's hands such that the person collides with the wall, etc.).

Other physical abuse: Intentionally inflicting pain on a person with one's body or with an object manipulated by one's hands (e.g. boring one's fist into a person's chest, strangling a person with one's hands, etc.).

Excessively tight handcuffing: Intentionally tying a person's hands together such that the person's hands immediately swell or go numb, are lacerated, or soon develop blisters.

Prolonged handcuffing: Intentionally or negligently leaving a person's hands tied together behind the person's back for more than three or four hours.

Prolonged forced kneeling: Intentionally forcing a person to kneel on his knees for more than two continuous hours, such that the person's legs go numb and/or cramp.

Prolonged exposure to sunlight: Intentionally or negligently forcing a person to remain in the sunlight for more than three or four continuous hours, such that the person develops a burn, becomes dehydrated, and/or experiences heat exhaustion.

Prolonged covering of eyes: Intentionally or negligently leaving a person's eyes covered for more than three or four hours, such that the person becomes disoriented.

Prolonged exposure to loud music: Intentionally or negligently subjecting a person to music at a high enough volume to inflict pain to the person's ears for more than one hour.

Deprivation of food: Intentionally or negligently withholding any food from a person for more than twelve hours, or intentionally withholding necessary amounts of food for more than one day (e.g. providing a person with only one spoonful of food per day for three days).

Deprivation of water: Intentionally or negligently withholding any water from person for more than three hours in high temperature settings, or intentionally withholding necessary amounts of water for more than one day (e.g. providing a person with only one liter of water per day for three days when the temperature exceeds 90 F each day).

Deprivation of minimal sanitary conditions: Intentionally or negligently failing to provide a person with opportunities to bathe, proper urination/defecation facilities or minimally sanitary living quarters for more than one week.

Deprivation of urination privileges: Intentionally preventing a person from using urination facilities, such that the person loses control of the person's bladder.

Refusal of necessary medical care: Intentionally or negligently refusing to give medical aid to a person in a situation of medical emergency (e.g. refusing to take a person to the hospital when the person has fainted and remains unconscious).

Electrocution: Intentionally shocking a person with painful amounts of electricity (e.g. shocking a person with a cattle prod for three minutes).

Prying off a toenail: Intentionally and forcefully removing a person's healthy toenail.

Psychological abuse: Intentionally subjecting a person to conditions that cause the person severe mental stress, disorientation, severe anxiety, and/or traumatic fear (e.g. blindfolding a person and his brother, forcing them to kneel next to each other, faking beating and shooting the brother, telling the person one killed his brother and will kill the person next, cocking one's gun, placing it to the person's head, and pretending to shoot).

Note: All of the examples given in the above definitions reflect actual testimonies from CPT investigations.